In a significant pivot, Iraqi militias were already scaling back their operations in the weeks leading up to the November 18 warning from Israel, after which their attacks dwindled almost entirely.
On November 18, 2024, Gideon Saar, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed his trepidations to the rotating president of the UN Security Council, voicing alarm over the surge in assaults by Iran-supported militias in Iraq directed at Israel. Saar underscored the obligation of the Iraqi government to curb these hostilities, asserting Israel’s unassailable right to defend itself if these armed factions continued their drone and missile onslaughts unchecked.
Militias dramatically curtail anti-Israel initiatives
Prior to Israel’s stern communication, there were already indications that Iraq’s militias were diminishing their aggressions towards Israel. The data (Graph 1) reveals a sharp decline, plummeting from a peak of 41 attacks during the October 29 to November 4 timeframe. However, post-Saar’s letter, the reduction in claims from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) has become nothing short of remarkable. To frame it differently: the Iraqi militias appeared to be not just retreating but virtually fleeing from their aggressive posturing since November 18.
Allegations of disingenuousness among Iraqi militias?
As the claims of these militias wane, their credibility simultaneously deteriorates. Since mid-November, there has been a stark absence of authentic close-up drone imagery, which previously bolstered their assertions—showing fresh visuals of drones marked by distinct identifiers (serial numbers, unique scratches). In its place, a curious pattern has emerged: recycled launch footage has become commonplace, with a solitary drone launch being filmed from various angles, leading to dubious claims of distinct attacks that might not have even transpired.
Weak rhetoric from militia leadership
The attempts by Iraq’s militia leaders to project resolve in the face of Israeli intimidation ring hollow; their communications reflect uncertainty rather than bravado.
Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS). On November 19, KSS commander Abbas al-Zaidi made an appearance on al-Rabiaa TV, asserting, “We possess the religious endorsement. We are the offspring of Marjaia, not mere government puppets… If Israel poses a threat to Iraq, our response shall be formidable and relentless…” (Figure 1). It’s unsurprising that KSS, known for their vocal posturing, would be the first to respond.
Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN). On November 20, Nujaba’s military aide, Abdal Qadir al-Karbalai, responded to Israeli provocations on his X account with a terse declaration: “To the stubborn Netanyahu: Your entity resembles a spider’s web in fragility, and it’s absurd for you to threaten the resolute Iraq of steadfastness and jihad. Our drones shall persist in haunting you, and there will be no refuge…” (Figure 2).
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). AAH found itself mentioned in Israel’s UN Security Council correspondence—an alarming stance for a faction that has cultivated a non-kinetic image for years, albeit to the detriment of its muqawama credibility. In a lengthy missive via its al-Sadiqun bloc on November 20, AAH staunchly denied any involvement in attacks against Israel, branding the Israeli letter a “blatant distortion of Iraq’s popular mobilization narrative” (Figure 3).
Kataib Hezbollah (KH). KH’s reaction on November 20 may shed light on the psyche of Iraqi muqawama leadership more than any other statement. They published an uncharacteristically candid interview with Secretary-General Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi (known as Abu Hussein), who stated, “The ultimate decision belongs to our allies in Hezbollah, as they are better positioned to discern their immediate and strategic interests.” When asked about the unity of the fronts, he reiterated Hezbollah’s authority over the decision-making process (Figure 4).
Badr. Recognized in the Israeli communiqué as one of the militant factions, Badr parliamentary member Mahdi al-Amerli stated on al-Ghadeer TV on November 21 that: “Any infringement of Iraqi sovereignty by the Israeli Zionist entity shall result in the annulment of the security accord between Baghdad and Washington” (Figure 5).
In our assessment, the spectrum of responses—uniformly lackluster—reveals crucial insights into the dynamics within the muqawama. Primarily, the Iraqi muqawama harbors a palpable fear of Israel sharpening its intelligence attention on them, as it has done with Palestinian factions and Lebanese Hezbollah. Moreover, these Iraqi groups have seemingly cooled their ardor, perhaps under Iran’s discreet encouragement, minimizing the risk of an Iran-initiated missile strike from Iraq, thereby lowering the immediate prospects of Israeli retaliatory strikes in the region. Finally, it’s evident that KH maintains a significant influence among the muqawama, with Abu Hussein emerging as the voice of reason during precarious times—offering insights reminiscent of his straightforward remarks from earlier events, indicating a willingness to mirror Hezbollah’s potential ceasefire decisions with Israel.
